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Abstract
The growing perception that the Internet is becoming an engine of global economic and
social change has inspired both governments and intergovernmental agencies to accelerate
the diffusion of the Internet around the globe via multimillion dollar programs and initiatives.
Unfortunately, few empirical studies guide these initiatives. The purpose of this research is
to investigate the causes that drive Internet capacity, with special emphasis on diffusion
theory. Global diffusion of IT requires some degree of structural conduciveness (similarities
between developed and developing countries in economic, political, and social structures)
as well as contact with developed countries. In our pooled time-series models of 58
developing nations over the 1995-2000 time period, we find that both structural
conduciveness (i.e., teledensity, service economies, political openness, and global urban
share) and globalization (i.e., aid share, tourist share, foreign investment share, and trade
share) shape the distribution and growth of Internet usage.
Keywords: Digital divide, diffusion, globalization, Internet, structural conduciveness

Introduction
One of the more profound technological revolutions occurring at the beginning of the 21st
1
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Century is the elegant blending of telecommunications and computer technology known as
the Internet. Evolving from humble beginnings as a U.S. Department of Defense project in
the 1960s (i.e., the ARPANET) to a mass-production/consumption technology propelled by
the World Wide Web, the Internet has outgrown its former role as a specialized tool of
governmental and academic elites. Today there is the growing perception that the Internet
may become a new, powerful engine of global economic and social change, and as such its
spread around the globe requires investigation.
The Internet’s economic implications have captured the lion’s share of scholarly attention.
In a nutshell, advanced telecommunications technology, including the Internet, reduces
economic transaction costs and minimizes uncertainty concerning the distribution of
goods/services in a high mass consumption society (Rostow, 1991; Hudson, 1997;
Hufbauer, 1996; Dewan and Kraemer, 2000). Much like transportation, the Internet’s
primary economic impact is via fluidity and efficiency in economic matters. The Internet is
similar to prior forms of telecommunications, although more extensive and revolutionary in a
number of ways (e.g., the richness of data transmission). Indeed, previous research
demonstrates a correlation—if not a causal relationship—between telecommunications
development, such as the telephone, and economic performance (Saunders et. al., 1994;
Dholakia and Harlam, 1994; Cronin et. al., 1993). Other research suggests that IT
investment over the past two decades has been important in fueling economic growth in
developed nations, which holds important implications for developing nations (Dewan and
Kraemer, 2000).
Not surprisingly, many international organizations hail the Internet as a powerful engine of
global social and economic transformation. In their “Charter on Global Information Society”
issued from Okinawa, Japan in 2000, the G8 (i.e., Group of Eight) asserted that, “Countries
that succeed in harnessing (IT) potential can look forward to leapfrogging conventional
obstacles of infrastructural development, to meeting more effectively their vital development
goals, such as poverty reduction, health, sanitation, and education, and to benefiting from
the rapid growth of global e-commerce.”
Unfortunately, an abyss yawns between those nations that have high Internet capacity and
usage and those that do not. According to the G8, the World Bank, and many other
international organizations, this so-called “digital divide” threatens to thwart the
transformative power of information technology for the world’s poorer nations.
The G8's “Okinawa Charter,” while apparently recognizing that the development of IT has
prerequisites that are not equally distributed among the nations of the world, nonetheless
promotes the idea that the private and public sectors of developed nations can somehow
bridge the digital divide and create global, universal connectivity in the very near future.
Ultimately, then, these international organizations are relying on globalization to accelerate
what might normally be the slow diffusion of a complex technological bundle.
In short, both structural conduciveness (modernization and post-industrialization) and
globalization processes are important for the diffusion of the Internet to the developing
world. Rogers (1995:5) defines diffusion as a process whereby an innovation is
communicated over time to members of a receiving social structure. Although there are
several dimensions implicit in this deceptively simple definition, two obvious foci are: (1) the
characteristics of the receiving social structure that may aid or impede adoption of the
innovation; and (2) the degree, depth, and intensity of the communication between the
sender and receiver. Structural conduciveness and contact are therefore important
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dimensions in any diffusion process.
Figure 1 diagrams our view of international diffusion. When an idea or technology diffuses
between two nations, one serves as the sender and the other as the receiver. Both the
quality and scope of globalization (between sender and receiver) and the receiver’s
structural similarities with the sending society (i.e., structural conduciveness) are critical in
facilitating the diffusion of ideas and technologies like the Internet. The overall geopolitical
context shapes the character and structure of societies and the nature of contact between
nations.

G
E
O
P
O
L
I
T
I
C
A
L
C
O
N
T
E
X
T

GLOBALIZATION
PROCESSES
BETWEEN
SOCIETIES

INTERNET
DIFFUSION TO
RECEIVING
SOCIETIES
STRUCTURAL
CONDUCIVENESS
OF RECEIVING
SOCIETIES

Figure 1. Macro-Social Processes of Internet Diffusion
In terms of structural conduciveness, while it is widely recognized that international social
change increasingly relies on cultural diffusion, the important role played by structural
compatibility between the sender and receiver has often been underemphasized or even
ignored by international policy organizations. This omission is particularly grievous in the
case of IT research because the Internet is so obviously a creature of post-industrialism.
Foremost, theories of technological and cultural diffusion suggest that diffusion occurs more
rapidly between homophilous (i.e., similar) parties in exchange relationships (Rogers
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1995:18-19). That is, the greater the similarity between two parties, the faster and more
thoroughly they share diffused artifacts (e.g., technology, language, religion). While
historical examples of this principle are legion (e.g., the rapid spread of the Industrial
Revolution from England to Scotland, New England, and Holland due in part to a common
Protestant heritage), application of the principle in development studies has never been
common.
Nonetheless, past cross-national research on Internet development has not ignored
structural conduciveness. Hargittai (1999) studied 18 OECD nations, finding evidence of
the overwhelming importance of the level of affluence (GDP per capita) on Internet
development. Norris (2001) used cross-sectional data for 179 countries to demonstrate that
economic development and investment in research and development were the overriding
factors in the level of Internet adoption. Robison and Crenshaw (2002), using data from
more than 70 countries, found strong evidence that the Internet is a post-industrial
phenomenon, being more quickly adopted by democratic states that possess advanced
service sector economies and highly-educated populations. Kiiski and Pohjola (2002) fit a
longitudinal model to predict change in Internet hosts from 1995 to 2000. Using samples of
approximately 75 nations, the authors confirmed the strong influence of GDP per capita,
human capital formation (schooling), and access costs on Internet adoption. Lucas and
Sylla (2003) estimated models based on pooled and partitioned samples of approximately
160 countries. They also found that general affluence is very important, with telephone
infrastructure and literacy also playing significant roles in the adoption of Internet
technology. Finally, Dewan et. al. (2005) demonstrate the very strong influence of gross
domestic product per capita on the development of communications technologies.
These studies suggest a handful of important structural features found in modern and
modernizing societies that may be critical to Internet development in the least developed
countries (LDCs). Four traits in particular stand out in the empirical literature: (1) the level of
economic complexity (i.e., development/infrastructure); (2) political openness (democracy);
(3) mass education/literacy; and (4) the economic configuration, with particular emphasis on
the service sector. These results suggest that the current optimism about the spread of
Internet connectivity should be tempered with a strong dose of realism. If structural
conduciveness severely constrains Internet development, then most LDCs will have only a
limited presence on the Internet for the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, the constraints of structural conduciveness might be eased by
globalization. Globalization commonly refers to a myriad of international networks involving
corporations, intergovernmental organizations, governments, and many other actors.
Although globalization is not a new phenomenon, what separates today’s globalization from
earlier forms of international openness is the extent and level of international integration, the
absence of overt colonialism, the emergence of international institutions governing
international law and commerce, and technological advances that have made
communication and transport ever cheaper and faster. As an economic conceptualization,
globalization commonly refers to the transfer of capital, technology, people, and goods and
services across a globally organized market of buyers and sellers.
How can such global linkages build Internet capacity in societies that might otherwise lack
the structural capacity for mass Internet usage? Regardless of the dimensionality of
globalization (i.e., whether economic, political or sociocultural), examples abound
suggesting that external agencies might “jump-start” IT development in otherwise unlikely
locales. For instance, the online magazine eMarketer (www.emarketer.com) has estimated
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that perhaps as much as 1% of global GDP accrues through business-to-business Internet
commerce, suggesting that foreign firms bring with them a sizeable internalized e-market
and thereby automatically boost the host country’s Internet presence. Non-governmental
organizations are also active in propagating Internet development and network-building. For
instance, the Association of Progressive Communications (www.apc.org) coordinates a
network of websites to bolster various social causes around the globe. Among its members
are GreenSpider in Hungary, a cyber-network dedicated to mobilizing people concerning
environmental issues in Eastern Europe, and Enda-Tiers Monde in Senegal, an NGO based
in Dakar to promote sustainable development. These members have expanded into
Internet service providers (ISPs) via the Association’s help, and now offer individual Web
access and e-mail. International tourism may also boost Internet traffic in the absence of
structural compatibility – an estimated 20% to 30% of online revenues to developing
countries accrue through travel arrangements made over the Net (ITU, 1999).
The purpose of this research is therefore to provide an empirical examination of the
influence of globalization on Internet capacity/development, holding constant structural
conduciveness. Ultimately, the broader impact of a study such as this one involves the
efficacy and efficiency of international IT initiatives. As noted previously, many OECD
governments and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are focusing on funding IT
programs to bridge the digital divide. If it proves that globalization can promote IT
development, but that structural conduciveness plays a strong role in the efficacy of such
endeavors, then it allows involved parties to efficiently target those nations/populations
where such technological and institutional aid is likely to have the largest effect in the
shortest period of time.

Methods
Following more recent conventions in cross-national research, we apply pooled time-series
cross-section analysis to an annualized panel of data covering much of the developing world
from 1995-2000.
Compared to a typical cross-sectional or time-series OLS design, one of the main
advantages of this method is a larger sample size acquired by combining a cross-section
and time-series design into a country-year database. Additionally, this methodology allows
us to analyze subtle changes over time in the dependent variable, whereas a typical crosssectional design focuses only on one or two points in time. Finally, a pooled analysis will
permit observation of variation over both time and space simultaneously.
The major disadvantage in using pooled time-series is that the error structure is complicated
by the inclusion of cases that can have non-random variation over space, time, and various
combination-sets of cases. Pooled analysis often violates standard OLS assumptions—that
the errors are homoscedastic and uncorrelated. Errors tend to be correlated across both
time and space. Furthermore, pooling data with an improper model specification may also
lead to the conclusion that the error terms are heteroscedastic and autocorrelated when, in
fact, they are not (Podesta, 2002).
To accommodate these potential problems, we follow Beck and Katz (1995, 1998) and use
an ordinary least squares model with panel-corrected standard errors. This procedure
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simultaneously corrects for heteroscedasticity and spatial autocorrelation by using
information about the contemporaneous error correlations (between cases) to calculate new
standard errors, which are then applied to a regular OLS model. The inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable corrects for serial autocorrelation. 2 We do not use fixed effects models
(the inclusion of dummies for country and time-specific effects) because of the limited
variability in some of our predictors. That is, given the abbreviated time span (1995-2000)
of our study, and hence the cross-sectional dependence of some of our variables, using
dummies for every case uses an excessive number of degrees of freedom (losing efficiency
thereby) and improperly obscures some genuine relationships in the data. As such, our
models follow a standard ordinary-least squares design with appropriate modifications.
Our dependent variable is the raw number of Internet hosts annualized for a wide range of
developing nations (1995 to 2000) (see appendix A for variables, descriptive statistics, and
sources). The term ‘host’ means any computer or server that has two-way access to other
computers and servers on the Internet. Each host has a specific “local or host number that,
together with the network number, forms its unique Internet Protocol address,” according to
a definition provided in whatis.com. A ”host” is a unique node in the global Internet.
Specifically, these Internet hosts are categorized according to their top level domain name
suffixes such as .uk or .ar for the United Kingdom or Argentina. These suffixes are
comparable to the commonly found .org, or .edu in the United States (note: most generic
".coms" are U. S. domains). We obtained these data from the Internet Software Consortium
(www.isc.org).3
The generic model can be specified as follows:
Yi,t = α + β Yi,t–1 + βk X k i,t–1 + εi,t
Where Yi,t is the Internet dependent variable for country i at time t, and Yi,t–1 is the same
variable lagged one year. X k i,t–1 is a vector of important covariates each lagged one year.
All independent variables are lagged one year to better capture causality. Finally, all
variables are logged to correct for skewness.

Structural Conduciveness Covariates
Our first set of models tests the influence of important structural (i.e., modernization and
post-industrialization) indicators on Internet capacity. We incorporate a one-year lagged
dependent variable for two reasons, one theoretical and the other statistical. First, it is
theoretically possible that a nation’s level of Internet development one year prior would
create multiplier effects, thereby inviting growth in capacity that subsequently ripples
through later years.
Second, including a lagged dependent variable effectively
accommodates serial autocorrelation (Beck and Katz, 1995; Podesta, 2002). The inclusion
of the lagged dependent variable renders our tests extremely conservative in that much less
variance is left for our theoretical variables to explain. Moreover, because we are focusing
2 For this analysis we use the panel-corrected standard errors feature in STATA (xtpcse). See
(Beck and Katz, 1995) and (Podesta, 2002).
3 The Internet Software Consortium (ISC) collects data through a networking program that “pings”
Internet hosts around the globe for numeric responses. The signal returns with the approximated
number of hosts per host category (top level domain name).
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on the determinants of Internet capacity in developing countries, we exclude OECD nations,
further restricting the available variance. 4
Prior research suggests that infrastructure and institutional environments play essential
roles in a nation’s structural conduciveness to Internet development. According to the
literature, the foremost proxy of infrastructural and institutional readiness should be a robust
network of telephone mainlines capable of transmitting electronic data. We include the log
of telephone mainlines per 1,000 persons for the period under investigation (1995-2000)
(World Bank, 2002). Given that Internet usage in many developing countries is almost
entirely dominated by dial-up connectivity via telephone lines, this measure directly taps a
nation’s technological conduciveness to Internet adoption.
We also include the percentage of the labor force that is employed in the general services
sector from the International Labor Organization data (World Bank, 2002). While objections
to the use of this variable could be made on the grounds that it includes informal and lowpaid services employment such as restaurant work, domestic services, and the like, it
should be noted that this measure also incorporates advanced services in the information
management and technology sectors. Moreover, a nation with a high level of services
employment and lower levels of manufacturing and agricultural employment is typically a
more complicated and hence more developed economy. Regardless, differentiating the
tertiary sector (i.e., traditional services) from the quaternary sector (i.e., information
services) is not possible given missing data for most developing countries.
Previous research also suggests that the political environment plays an important role in
Internet deployment (Robison and Crenshaw, 2002; Crenshaw and Robison, 2006).
Theoretically, a political institution that is open (or "liberal") to political, economic, and social
competition among its citizenry is probably more likely to embrace a diversified, informationdiffusing, and empowering communications technology like the Internet. For this study, we
make use of the Polity IV’s rank measure of political openness (Marshall and Jaggers,
2004).
We adapted our global urbanization variable from the World Development Indicators
database. This measure is a nation’s percent share of the total world urban population. We
calculate our variable by dividing the urban population of a nation in a given year by an
estimate of the world’s urbanized population for that year. Essentially this indicates a
nation’s “share” or “rank” in the global network of urban agglomerations, a very rough proxy
for the post-industrial islands known as megacities. Such massive urban concentrations
provide and fuel the requisite capital, infrastructure, and market demand for significant
Internet capacity as well as the prior technological and social connections to the postindustrial world, even in nations that are presently quite backward technologically.
4 The following 58 cases appear in all models in Table 1. Numeric superscripts on the three
cases below indicate those nations that are omitted from the respectively numbered equations in
Table 2. Omitted cases are due to missing data for tourism share, trade share and foreign
(eq5,6)
investment share. Azerbaijan, Argentina, Bahrain
, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Belarus,
Kampuchea, Sri Lanka, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica,
(eq1,3)
Kazakhstan
, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco,
Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia,
(eq4,6)
Singapore, Vietnam
, Slovenia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago,
Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Egypt, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela.
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Certainly, surveys in advanced countries suggest urbanization and Internet usage are
strongly correlated (Horrigan et. al., 2005).

Globalization Covariates
In addition to basic internal and institutional variables as measures of structural
conduciveness, we include three measures of economic globalization: trade as a share of
world total, foreign direct investment as a share of world total, and economic aid (official
development assistance) as a share of world total (OECD, 2004). These three measures
indicate a nation’s connectivity with the rest of the world via flows of raw and manufactured
goods and capital.
Each indicator is the aggregate aid, trade, and investment within a nation divided by the
global total for that particular year. Theoretically, we expect that the higher a nation is in the
world’s economic hierarchy, the more pressure to augment global connectivity with digital
communications and other advanced IT modalities (e.g., email, web hosting, business-tobusiness communications). In other words, nations that regularly rank high in terms of
trade, investment, and aid should have the revenues necessary to make advanced
communications outlays as well as the incentive to communicate with, and hence cultivate,
stronger relationships with trading, investment, and aid partners via Internet technologies.
All three measures are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database (World
Bank, 2002).
Last, we include a social dimension of globalization: tourist arrivals as a share of world total
for each year from the World Tourism Organization, adapted from the WDI database (World
Bank, 2002). Again, theory would suggest that tourists come with cyber-strings (i.e., their
need for global connectivity). A burgeoning tourist mecca would create strong demand for
instant and up-to-date information and communications between tourist senders and
receivers—a situation readily apparent in the significant numbers of well-financed tourist
information/catalogue websites established by national tourism bureaus and travel
agencies. And, of course, the bulk of tourists are from post-industrial or otherwise affluent
nations, and many such travelers have come to rely on digital communications. In short,
their presence in a country should generate demand for computers, ISPs, and other
supporting infrastructure.

Analysis
We present the results for the panel-corrected pooled time-series models below. Table 1
provides the standardized estimates for our base model—internal structural and institutional
characteristics that shape Internet supply and demand. Table 2 pits our globalization
predictors against this base (conduciveness) model.
Table 1 suggests that our five structural indicators strongly predict Internet growth in the
developing world—the logs of the lagged dependent variable, telephone mainlines per
1,000 persons (or teledensity), employment in the service sector, political openness, and a
nation’s global share of urban population are all positive and statistically significant
predictors of the log of Internet hosts over time (i.e., from 1995 to 2000). In addition to the
very strong effect of the lagged dependent variable (which assumes the lion’s share of the
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available variance), our main measure of infrastructure/affluence (teledensity) is positively
and significantly related to Internet deployment over time (Equation 1). The additions of the
service sector indicator, political openness, and urban share do not change the impact of
teledensity. Referring to the unstandardized coefficients produced by Equation 4 (not
shown), a 1% increase in teledensity leads to approximately a twelfth of a percent increase
in the log of Internet hosts – a finding that is roughly consistent across equations.
Table 1. Internet Hosts Regressed on Internal Infrastructural and Institutional
Characteristics (1995-2000) Standardized Coefficients
Equation 1
B
SE
Intercept
0.710
.094
Log of Internet Hosts t-1
0.910** .050
Log of Telephone mainlines per K t-1
0.073** .038
Log of Employment in Services Sector t-1
Log of Political Openness t-1
Log of Global Urban Share t-1
N
319
Number of Countries
58
2
R
0.895
2
Adjusted R
0.895
Wald Prob > Chisq
0.000
Note: ** p < .05 * p < .10 (two-tailed tests)

Equation 2
B
SE
0.474
0.905**
0.056**
0.044**

319
58
0.897
0.896
0.000

.129
.050
.042
.083

Equation 3
B
SE
0.488
0.902**
0.052**
0.040**
0.017**

.128
.049
.044
.090
.031

319
58
0.897
0.896
0.000

Equation 4
B
SE
0.298
0.867**
0.064**
0.062**
0.044**
.104**
319
58
0.905
0.904
0.000

.108
.047
.043
.090
.031
1.997

Similarly, equations 2 through 4 demonstrate that political openness, employment in the
services sector and global urban share all positively and significantly contribute to Internet
development.
Comparing the standardized coefficients in Equation 4 indicates that global urban share is
less influential than the lagged Internet infrastructure variable, yet slightly more important
than the other structural variables. The weakest effect in this equation and across the
models is our political indicator, while both teledensity and employment in the services
sector contribute almost equally to Internet development.
That the five structural conduciveness measures are influential and independent of one
another suggests that Internet development in developing nations benefits from a modern,
post-industrial foundation. Consistent with previous research, our analyses confirm that
Internet diffusion is accelerated by robust infrastructure, political democracy, and a growing
service sector (Hargittai, 1999; Robison and Crenshaw, 2002; Kiiski and Pohjola, 2002;
Lucas and Sylla, 2003; Crenshaw and Robison, 2006). In addition, those developing
countries that are integral to the world’s urban system have a much easier time embracing
Internet development.
Table 2 demonstrates the importance of globalization measures to Internet growth within
developing countries. In the first two equations we entered tourism and official development
assistance as shares of their respective world totals. While both attain statistical significance
when entered independently, tourist share is roughly twice as strong as aid share.
Moreover, when both are entered simultaneously (Equation 3), aid share drops out
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Table 2. Internet Hosts Regressed on Globalization Indicators (1995-2000) Standardized Coefficients
Equation 1

Equation 2

Equation 3

Equation 4

Equation 5

Equation 6

B

B

B

B

B

B

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

Intercept

0.2663**

0.19

-4.4732**

2.33

-2.9272

3.06

0.3710**

0.10

-1.0463*

0.64

0.3514

1.02

Log of Internet Hosts t-1

0.8468**

0.05

0.8497**

0.05

0.8440**

0.05

0.8233**

0.05

0.8635**

0.04

0.8334**

0.04

Log of Telephone Mainlines per K t-1

0.0488**

0.05

0.0757**

0.05

0.0576*

0.06

0.0530**

0.03

0.0494**

0.04

0.0407**

0.03

Log of Employment in Services Sector t-1

0.0659**

0.05

0.0643**

0.09

0.0666**

0.05

0.0599**

0.08

0.0617**

0.09

0.0598**

0.08

Log of Political Openness t-1

0.0510**

0.03

0.0475**

0.03

0.0530**

0.03

0.0550**

0.04

0.0470**

0.03

0.0585**

0.04

Log of Global Urban Share t-1

0.0458**

1.78

0.0821**

1.54

0.0373**

1.03

0.0289**

1.14

0.0633**

2.68

0.0282

3.09

Log Tourist Arrival Share t-1

0.0769**

1.56

0.0681**

1.77

0.0396**

7.84

0.0269

10.24
0.1220**

2.11

0.1186**

2.24

0.0006

3.49

Log of Official Development Assistance t-1
Log of Trade Share t-1
Log FDI share t-1

0.0442**

N
Number of Countries
R

2

Adjusted R

2

Wald Prob > Chisq

2.28

312

319

312

314

314

309

57

58

57

57

57

56

0.9113

0.9063

0.9091

0.9064

0.9115

0. 9088

0. 9070

0. 9045

0. 9070

0. 9046

0. 9098

0.9118

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
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altogether. Thus, tourism proves to be the more influential global connectivity measure of
the two. Curiously, the significance level of teledensity is weakened by the addition of
tourism and aid, perhaps suggesting that tourism needs adequate infrastructure to promote
Internet development. In other words, a confluence of infrastructure and external inputs is
important for technological adoption.
In a similar fashion, our two main economic indicators, trade and foreign investment as
shares of their respective global totals, are positive and statistically significant when entered
separately. The final model (Equation 6) suggests, however, that only trade affects internet
development in a unique way, ceteris paribus. This suggests that trade is a more important
contributor to Internet development than investment, probably because the importance of
foreign investment is in its promotion of trade flows, which in turn place concomitant
demands on communications technologies. Interestingly, the simultaneous inclusion of both
economic globalization measures washes out the significance of global urban share. This
suggests that neither structural conduciveness nor globalization alone promotes Internet
development, but rather it is the conjunction of both internal and external factors that proves
crucial. For instance, because urbanism encourages trade and attracts foreign investment
(Crenshaw, 1991), it is highly likely that the urban-economic globalization matrix proves
essential for technological deployment. At the very least, having growing connections with
the world in terms of trade and investment may accelerate a nascent process of postindustrialization, in this case, the adoption of a post-industrial technology—the Internet.

Discussion
Our results indicate that both structural conduciveness and globalization are important for
Internet development within developing countries. Although conduciveness to digitalized
technology may be sufficient to develop it, global contacts with already-digitalized societies
apparently boost the adoption rate among developing societies. Precisely, we demonstrate
that a strong telephone infrastructure, robust service sector employment, high levels of
political openness and large urban agglomerations provide the groundwork for Internet
deployment, as measured by Internet hosts over time. Moreover, we also demonstrate that
global shares of tourism and trade uniquely contribute to Internet development in less
developed countries. Thus, specific internal and external conditions form a confluence of
forces that determines the current distribution and growth of Internet usage.
Although wireless technology and other innovations may change our prognosis in the near
future, our results lead us to strongly qualify the optimism of some international
organizations. “Jump-starting” Internet development sans infrastructure, democracy, and
advanced markets (i.e., structures conducive to IT) will be an uphill battle.
Our results suggest that global flows of people, money, and information follow existing
channels in the world order, channels solidly anchored in structural conditions that provide
the need for communication – democracy encourages trade and tourism, service sectors
encourage outsourcing and trade in invisibles, and large urban agglomerations provide the
post-industrial islands that concentrate both labor and consumer markets. That these
channels or conduits should become digitalized makes sense, and they will in large part
determine the immediate distribution and growth of the World Wide Web. Nevertheless, as
important as digital development is, our findings suggest that such development should not
overshadow the earlier focus on economic growth.
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The research presented here has important limitations that should not be ignored, however.
First of all, our measure of Internet hosts may not adequately capture the actual global
network. The source of information on Internet hosts is from a single organization that uses
a single pinging method only twice a year to capture an image of Internet capacity. ISC
admits also that one cannot ascertain with exact certainty the precise physical location of
the Internet site, since the data is aggregated by the top-level domain name (.ar suffix for
Argentina, for instance, can be registered virtually anywhere, including within the U.S.).
Finally, the raw number of hosts does not fully measure the depth of Internet use—either in
terms of quality of usage (who uses it, why, and to what extent) or the number of users.
These figures cannot tell us how many people are online at the moment of the survey or to
what extent they were making use of the Internet.
Further research is needed to explore or develop better measures of the global Internet that
include, but are not limited to, host-computer data, end-user figures, generic domain-level
data, and other information on servers and networks. Moreover, more research is needed
on the quality and scope of Internet use at the cross-cultural level of analysis (Hargittai,
2005).
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Appendix A
Variable (logs)

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Internet Hosts
Internet Hosts t-1
Telephone Mainlines/K t-1
Employment in Services Sector t-1
Political Openness t-1

319
319
319
319
319

3.158632
2.778976
1.912739
1.636354
0.697025

1.065221
1.237817
0.505272
0.246603
0.386457

0
0
0.39794
0.612784
0

5.744041
5.419316
2.800098
1.877947
1.041393

Global Urban Share t-1
Global Tourism Share t-1
Global ODA Share t-1
Global Trade Share t-1
Global FDI Share t-1

319
312
319
317
314

0.003584
0.005797
0.302946
0.005645
0.304738

0.008449
0.008947
0.002554
0.009142
0.010012

0.000053
0.000173
0.298913
0.000147
0.297252

0.057964
0.055911
0.316161
0.053827
0.382196
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